



Defence Techniques of Man-In-The-Middle-Attack using SSL and HTTPS

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***ABSTRACT:** Protecting our data online is never going to be an easy task, especially nowadays when attackers are regularly inventing some new techniques and exploits to steal your data. Sometimes their attacks will not be so harmful for individual users. But large-scale attacks on some popular websites or financial databases, could be highly dangerous. In most cases, the attackers first try to push some malware on to user's machine. Sometimes this technique doesn't work out, however. Most of the effective defenses against MITM can be found only on router or server side. We don't having any dedicated control over the security of our transaction. The ultimate goal of our proposed system is to create secure channels over insecure networks. Secure Socket Layers (SSL), or Transport Layer Security (TLS) in its more modern implementation, is protocols designed to provide security for network communication by means of encryption. This protocol is most commonly associated with other protocols to provide a secure implementation of the service that protocol provides that is HTTPS with secure socket layer.*

I. INTRODUCTION

With the development of e-commerce and cloud Computing, SSL protocol is more and more widely used in all kinds of network services. SSL protocol by providing end to end authentication, message encryption, message Integrity check and other security mechanisms protects the security of the communication process. For example, Yahoo ensures the security of the mail account through SSL, to protect the safety of the user e-mail account. Amazon shields the user transaction account and transaction security by it. In recent years, due to the development of cloud computing, the connection security between the client and the cloud is also an extremely important issue. December 2009, VeriSign announced, VeriSign will provide security and authentication services cloud-based computing for Microsoft Windows Azure platform. And Microsoft will use VeriSign SSL Certificate and VeriSign code signing certificate, to ensure the security of the cloud-based computing services and applications that being developed and deployed on the Windows Azure platform. Because, in the using of cloud computing model, the users' all computing resources are stored in the cloud, so network connection is essential for you to normally work. Therefore, if the server ends were safe enough, the security of network transmission would become very important. The SSL protocol is widely embedded in the client browser currently, the server-side also is relatively easy to deploy and implement, and the SSL protocol itself has good security features.

Man in the middle attack on SSL

A man-in-the-middle attack is an attack where the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communication between two parties who believe they are directly communicating with each other.

Suppose Alice wishes to communicate with Bob. Meanwhile, Mallory wishes to intercept the conversation to eavesdrop and optionally to deliver a false message to Bob.




Figure MITM

A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is a form of eavesdropping where communication between two users is monitored and modified by an unauthorized party. Generally, the attacker actively eavesdrops by intercepting a public key message exchange and retransmits the message while replacing the requested key with his own. In the process, the two original parties appear to communicate normally. The message sender does not recognize that the receiver is an unknown attacker trying to access or modify the message before retransmitting to the receiver. Thus, the attacker controls the entire communication.

The internet is growing tremendously and the data being passed is becoming crucial for the organization, we need to provide the customers as well as the organization some level of privacy and authentication so that all the users in this internet-world can assure that they are contacting the right person. To provide the user and the organization this level of security Netscape came up with a solution called Secured Socket Layer (SSL) in 1994. They never released the 1st version of SSL because of some limitations in the system. SSLv2 was released in 1994, and later IETF standardized SSL and released SSLv3.0 strengthening the protocol by adding more secured algorithms and handle the credential information more securely. They renamed the next upgraded version of the SSLv3.1 as TLSv1.0 (Transport Layer Security).

SSL was developed keeping in mind to provide information privacy and security, but still this protocol has some limitations. First of all, the SSL follows the weak model of PKI: web-model. Web-model is best for large scale implementation for the SSL, but the problem is that there are 2 types of Trust Roots in web model: CA, and User. Here user can also judge whether or not they should allow any other certifications that are not in CA. Secondly, the attacks that the SSL face are majorly from MITM attack, mainly ARP poisoning, wherein the attacker can hijack the secured session and can get the secured credentials.

In this thesis, we have discussed a scheme to strengthen the SSL using a Firefox add-on which can detect any spurious SSL certificates and a bash shell script which can be run on any Linux system to counteract against RP-poisoning.

DEFENCES TECHNIQUES OF MITM ATTACK

Trusting Keys and Certificates a client that wants to connect to an application site starts using the certificate sent by the site. An attacker can intercept the conversation and send the client a fake certificate, claiming that it comes from the application site. If the client trusts the fake certificate, the MITM attack becomes possible.

- The solution to this problem is to use a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) to verify that the certificate, digital signature, or key belongs to the person using it. By adding strong authentication on PKI systems, any certificate coming from a non-trusted CA will be revoked, including the attacker's fake certificate.
- Public key infrastructures
- PKI mutual authentication the main defence in a PKI scenario is mutual authentication. In this case as well as the application validating the user (not much use if the application is rogue) - the users devices validates the application - hence distinguishing rogue applications from genuine applications
- Secret keys (which are usually high information entropy secrets, and thus more secure)

- e. Passwords (which are usually low information entropy secrets, and thus less secure
- f. Off-channel verification
- g. Carry forward verifications
- h. Other criteria, such as voice recognition or other biometrics
- i. Second (secure) channel verification
- j. One time password are immune to MITM attacks, assuming the security and trust of the one-time pad.
- k. Forensic analysis of MITM attacks
 - (a). IP address of the server
 - (b). Is the certificate self signed?
 - (c). Do other clients, elsewhere on the Internet, also get the same certificate?
 - (d). Is the certificate signed by a trusted CA?

SSL:

SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) is a standard security technology for establishing an encrypted link between a server and a client—typically a web server (website) and a browser; or a mail server and a mail client.

SSL have three protocols under it: Handshake Protocol; Record Protocol; and Alert Protocol. Handshake protocol is used to establish the secure connection between the client and the server using the cipher suites and other parameters that both have agreed upon. Record Protocol is used to encrypt the data that is to be sent through the network using the key that have been established during the handshake protocol. Alert protocol is used to send the custom messages to other whenever they detect any intrusion in the system. As I need to show the defects in the SSL methods, handshake protocol need to be discussed first. It is as follows:

Step 1: Client Sends a **Client Hello** message to the server he wishes to contact. This message contains the Version No of the SSL which client can support with a 32-byte random no. this message also contains the Cipher Suites and the Compression Method that the client can support.

Step 2: Now the Server sends a **Server Hello** message to the client. This message is the complement to the Client Hello message. This message contains the version of SSL both the party will support, 32-byte random no., Session ID and the cipher suite and the compression method that it will support.

Step 3: Server then sends the **Server Key Exchange** message to the client. This message contains the public key information itself, for e.g.: the Public Key in case of RSA. Then to authenticate the client, server requests for the client's certificate information, if it has one.

Step 4: After all the information have been passed to the client, server sends a **Server Hello done** indicating the client that server's phase of initial negotiation have been done and now its clients turn.

Step 5: Now the client will send its key information to the server with **Client Key Exchange** message encrypted with the server public key so that the legitimate server only can access client's information.

Step 6: Now as both the client and the server have sent their key information and other parameters, Client sends a **Change Cipher Spec** message to the server to notify all the parameters of the secured connection and activate the same.

Step 7: Then the client sends the **Finished** message to the server to let it check the newly activated options.

Step 8: The server sends the same **Change Cipher Spec** to the client to notify all the options in the secured connections and then send the **finished** message to client to verify all the options. Next to the Handshake Protocol is the Record Layer Protocol. This layer encapsulates all the data into a frame format of size 5bytes preceding other protocol messages. This protocol provides a single frame format for Alert, Change Cipher Spec, Handshake, and Application Data.




Figure 1: SSL Handshake

Protocol Overview: Diffie Hellman:

The MITM Detection Protocol is split into three stages. During the first stage, known as the Session Key Exchange stage, Alice and Bob derive a session key using the Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange algorithm. Without a trusted public key exchange mechanism, the D-H key exchange is vulnerable to a MITM attack. Consequently, Alice and Bob are not certain if they are victims of a MITM attack. When Eve is present, Alice and Bob will misinterpret each other's public key with Eve's public key resulting in compromised information. Despite Eve's presence, Alice and Bob move to stage two, the Commitment stage, in an effort to detect Eve. From this point forward, information sent from Alice, Bob or Eve shall be encrypted with their derived session key. Stage two is identified as the Commitment stage where Alice forces Eve to modify her specially crafted message that contains a committed value coupled with their public cryptographic keys. If Eve decides to forward Alice's original message, then Eve's presence would be detected with certainty. If Eve desires to avoid detection, she must recreate Alice's special message coupling with Eve and Bob's public keys. However, without knowing Alice's value before commitment, Eve is forced to guess and commit a value. Alice eventually reveals her original value to Eve. To maintain consistency, Eve must reveal her guessed value to Bob. Using both original values, Alice and Bob compute y . If Alice and Bob hold identical values of y , then Eve ceases to exist; otherwise, Alice and Bob are communicating through Eve. In either case, neither Alice nor Bob know if their y values match at the end of stage two. During the third stage, the Detection stage, Alice and Bob will use their y values acquired in stage two to enhance their communication environment. If Alice and Bob have identical values, then their environmental enhancements will remain consistent. However, if their values do not match, then Eve must translate messages from one communication environment to another to avoid detection. Due to physical limitations of each environment, Eve will not be able to sustain her message translation capabilities between her victims, thus being detected. There are seven scenarios that can be applied in stage three. Each scenario provides a limitation where Eve's existence is detected.

II. RELATED WORK

1. Ritesh Kumar Yadav, "Man in Middle Attack in SSL and HTTPS" International Journal of Computer Science and Mobile Computing, Volume 4(May 2015)

With the development of e-commerce and cloud Computing, SSL protocol is more and more widely used in all kinds of network services. SSL protocol by providing end to end authentication, message encryption, message Integrity check and other security mechanisms protects the security of the communication process. For example, Yahoo ensures the security of the mail account through SSL, to protect the safety of the user e-mail account. Amazon shields the user transaction account and transaction security by it. In recent years, due to the development of cloud computing, the connection security between the client and the cloud is also an extremely important issue. December 2009, VeriSign announced, VeriSign will provide security and authentication services cloud-based computing for Microsoft Windows Azure

platform. And Microsoft will use VeriSign SSL Certificate and VeriSign code signing certificate, to ensure the security of the cloud-based computing services and applications that being developed and deployed on the Windows Azure platform. Because, in the using of cloud computing model, the users` all computing resources are stored in the cloud, so network connection is essential for you to normally work. Therefore, if the server ends were safe enough, the security of network transmission would become very important. The SSL protocol is widely embedded in the client browser currently, the server-side also is relatively easy to deploy and implement, and the SSL protocol itself has good security features

2. Italo Dacosta, Mustaque Ahamad, and Patrick Traynor, "Trust No One Else: Detecting MITM Attacks Against SSL/TLS Without Third-Parties", US National Science Foundation (CAREER CNS-0952959)

The security guarantees provided by SSL/TLS depend on the correct authentication of servers through certificates signed by a trusted authority. However, as recent incidents have demonstrated, trust in these authorities is not well placed. Increasingly, certificate authorities (by coercion or compromise) have been creating forged certificates for a range of adversaries, allowing seemingly secure communications to be intercepted via man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.

A variety of solutions have been proposed, but their complexity and deployment costs have hindered their adoption. In this paper, They proposed Direct Validation of Certificates (DVCert), a novel protocol that, instead of relying on third-parties for certificate validation, allows domains to directly and securely vouch for their certificates using previously established user authentication credentials. By relying on a robust cryptographic construction, this relatively simple means of enhancing server identity validation is not only efficient and comparatively easy to deploy, but it also solves other limitations of third-party solutions. There extensive experimental analysis in both desktop and mobile platforms shows that DVCert transactions require little computation time on the server (e.g., less than 1 ms) and are unlikely to degrade server performance or user experience. In short, they provide a robust and practical mechanism to enhance server authentication and protect web applications from MITM attacks against SSL/TLS.

3. Praveen Kumar Mishra "Analysis of MITM attack in secure simple pairing" Journal of Global Research in Computer science, Volume 4 No.2 ,February 2013

A man in the middle attack is one in which the attacker intercepts messages in a public key exchange and then retransmits them, substituting his own public key for the requested one, so that the two original parties still appear to be communicating with each other. In the process, the two original parties appear to communicate normally. The message sender does not recognize that the receiver is an unknown attacker trying to access or modify the message before retransmitting to the receiver. Thus, the attacker controls the entire communication. [2] This term is also known as a janus attack or a fire brigade attack. Active man-in-the-middle is an attack method that allows an intruder to access sensitive information by intercepting and altering communications between the user of a public network and any requested website. Avoiding logging in to sensitive sites from public locations can protect the user from conventional man-in-the-middle attacks. However, in an active MITM attack, the perpetrator manipulates communications in such a way that they can steal information for sites accessed at other times.

An active MITM may be conducted in a number of ways.

- a. The attacker listens to communications transmitted over a public network.
- b. The victim accesses the Internet over the network and browses to an innocuous website, such as a mainstream news site.
- c. The website server processes the request and responds to it.
- d. The attacker intercepts the response sent from the server and interjects an I Frame object targeting their chosen site.
- e. When the user's browser receives the compromised response, it invisibly requests that website along with the cookie storing user credentials for the site.
- f. This response allows the attacker to log in to the site and interact in any way that the valid user can.

4. Pushpendra Kumar Pateriya, Srijith S. Kumar, "Analysis on Man in the Middle Attack on SSL", International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 8887) Volume 45No.23, May 2012.

Man-In-The-Middle attack is the major attack on SSL. Some of the major attacks on SSL are ARP poisoning and the phishing attack. Phishing is the social engineering attack to steal the credential information from the user using either fake certificates or fake web-pages. Same in the case of ARP Poisoning, where in the attacker act as middle-man in the

client-server communication channel. MITM attack makes the users difficult to understand that whether they are connected to original secured connection or not. Since the certificate that is being passed during the connection setup is insecure, attacker can easily modify the information in the certificate and leave the approval of the certificate to the user. Since many users are not well educated about the whereabouts of the forged certificates and their corresponding attacks, they accept the certificates making way for the attackers to implement the attack. To deal with such attacks, two approaches have been proposed: one for the ARP poisoning; and other for phishing attack. In this paper, Pushpendra Kumar Pateriya solutions for the ARP poisoning attack and the Fake Certification Attack over SSL have been provided. The shell script will check for the ARP-IP of the gateway and other network devices and check for any modifications made into the ARP cache. The other browser plug-in may not be a successor to as that in , but will provide a better client side protection to the user.

5. Martin Georgiev, Subodh Iyengar, Suman Jana, *The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software*, CCS'12, October 16–18, 2012, Raleigh, North Carolina, USA.

(Secure Sockets Layer) is the de facto standard for secure Internet communications. Security of SSL connections against an active network attacker depends on correctly validating public-key certificates presented when the connection is established. They demonstrate that SSL certificate validation is completely broken in many security-critical applications and libraries. Vulnerable software includes Amazon's EC2 Java library and all cloud clients based on it; Amazon's and PayPal's merchant SDKs responsible for transmitting payment details from e-commerce sites to payment gateways; integrated shopping carts such as osCommerce, ZenCart, Ubercart, and PrestaShop; AdMob code used by mobile websites; Chase mobile banking and several other Android apps and libraries; Java Web-services middleware—including Apache Axis, Axis 2, Codehaus XFire, and Pusher library for Android—and all applications employing this middleware. Any SSL connection from any of these programs is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack.

The root causes of these vulnerabilities are badly designed APIs of SSL implementations (such as JSSE, OpenSSL, and GnuTLS) and data-transport libraries (such as URL) which present developers with a confusing array of settings and options. They analyze perils and pitfalls of SSL certificate validation in software based on these APIs and present our recommendations.

6. Maryam Ahmed, Baharan Sanjabi, Difo Aldiaz, "Diffie-Hellman and Its Application in Security Protocols", *International Journal of Engineering Science and Innovative Technology (IJESIT)* Volume 1, Issue 2, November 2012

With the wide use of the Internet, virtually everyone is now connected to each other through their computers. This has led to a positive impact in the human environment socially, economically and in their day-to-day transactions. There is, however, a major hindrance in trying to establish an effective and safe communication line: an outside user, not intended to be a part of the connection, might try to steal the information being passed to a legitimate user. This being a security issue, information security therefore plays a vital role in Internet transactions. It can be deduced that secure digital communication is necessary for many aspects relating to web based activities, e-commerce, and secured instant messaging. More so for private, confidential, and vital information, the reality that safe, secure communication between parties communicating over the Internet is now a necessity cannot be overstated. Cryptography is an indispensable tool for protecting information in computer systems. Today's cryptosystems are divided into two categories: symmetric and asymmetric. The difference lies in the keys used in decryption and encryption—symmetric cryptography uses the same key for both of these processes, whereas asymmetric cryptosystems use one key (the public key) to encrypt a message and a different key (the private key) to decrypt it. In this paper, Maryam Ahmed [5] The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is one of the more well-known asymmetric algorithms, formulated by its namesakes Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976. It is referred to in various ways, e.g. Diffie-Hellman protocol, Diffie-Hellman handshake, or Diffie-Hellman key negotiation, and commonly shortened to D–H, or DH, for convenience.

7. Soghoian, C., Stamm, S.: *Certified Lies: Detecting and Defeating Government Interception Attacks Against SSL*. In: *Proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security* (2011): 1-17

Consider a hypothetical situation where an American executive is in France for a series of trade negotiations. After a day of meetings, she logs in to her corporate webmail account using her company-provided laptop and the hotel wireless network. Relying on the training she received from her company's IT department, she makes certain to look for the SSL encryption lock icon in her web browser, and only after determining that the connection is secure does she enter her login credentials and then begin to upload materials to be shared with her colleagues. However, unknown to the executive, the

French government has engaged in a sophisticated man-in-the-middle attack, and is able to covertly intercept the executive's SSL encrypted connections. Agents from the state security apparatus leak details of her communications to the French company with whom she is negotiating, who use the information to gain an upper hand in the negotiations. While this scenario is fictitious, the vulnerability is not. The security and confidentiality of millions of internet transactions per day depend upon the Secure Socket Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. At the core of this system are a number of Certificate Authorities (CAs), each of which is responsible for verifying the identity of the entities to whom they grant SSL certificates. It is because of the confidentiality and authenticity provided by the CA based public key infrastructure that users around the world can bank online, engage in electronic commerce and communicate with their friends and loved ones about the most sensitive of subjects without having to worry about malicious third parties intercepting and deciphering their communications. While not completely obvious, the CAs are all trusted equally in the SSL public key infrastructure, a problem amplified by the fact that the major web browsers trust hundreds of different firms to issue certificates for any site. Each of these firms can be compelled by their national government to issue a certificate for any particular website that all web browsers will trust without warning. Thus, users around the world are put in a position where their browser entrusts their private data, indirectly, to a large number of governments (both foreign and domestic) whom these individuals may not ordinarily trust.

III. CONCLUSION

Three protocol SSL, HTTP and hybridization of ssl and https of attack on the session are feasible. In normal, connection speed of HTTPS services is 2-100 times slower than normal HTTP connection, users will not be aware of attacks even if the delay caused by the change of link. Using SSL HTTPS effectively to avoid the attack. However we can't say that Man-in-the-middle Attack can be secured completely because the base selected by the middle man can be same as that 'e' unfortunately. How to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks on HTTPS session more effective is the next focus of our study.

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