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### **RESEARCH ARTICLE**

# **DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM (DSA) BASED SECURE INTRUSION-DETECTION SYSTEM FOR MANETS**

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**ABSTRACT**— *The migration to wireless network from wired network has been a global trend in the past few decades. The mobility and scalability brought by wireless network made it possible in many applications. Among all the contemporary wireless networks, Mobile Ad hoc NETWORK (MANET) is one of the most important and unique applications. On the contrary to traditional network architecture, MANET does not require a fixed network infrastructure; every single node works as both a transmitter and a receiver. Nodes communicate directly with each other when they are both within the same communication range. Otherwise, they rely on their neighbors to relay messages. The self-configuring ability of nodes in MANET made it popular among critical mission applications like military use or emergency recovery. However, the open medium and wide distribution of nodes make MANET vulnerable to malicious attackers. In this case, it is crucial to develop efficient intrusion-detection mechanisms to protect MANET from attacks. With the improvements of the technology and cut in hardware costs, we are witnessing a current trend of expanding MANETs into industrial applications.*

**Index Terms**— *Digital signature, digital signature algorithm (DSA), Enhanced Adaptive ACKnowledgement (AACK) (EAACK), Mobile Ad hoc NETWORK (MANET)*

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

Due to their natural mobility and scalability, wireless networks are always preferred since the first day of their invention. Owing to the improved technology and reduced costs, wireless networks have gained much more preferences over wired networks in the past few decades.

By definition, Mobile Ad hoc NETWORK (MANET) is a collection of mobile nodes equipped with both a wireless transmitter and a receiver that communicate with each other via

bidirectional wireless links either directly or indirectly. Industrial remote access and control via wireless networks are becoming more and more popular these days . One of the major advantages of wireless networks is its ability to allow data communication between different parties and still maintain their mobility. However, this communication is limited to the range of transmitters. This means that two nodes cannot communicate with each other when the distance between the two nodes is beyond the communication range of their own. MANET solves this problem by allowing intermediate parties to relay data transmissions.

## II. BACKGROUND

### A. IDS in MANETs

As discussed before, due to the limitations of most MANET routing protocols, nodes in MANETs assume that other nodes always cooperate with each other to relay data. This assumption leaves the attackers with the opportunities to achieve significant impact on the network with just one or two compromised nodes. To address this problem, an IDS should be added to enhance the security level of MANETs. If MANET can detect the attackers as soon as they enter the network, we will be able to completely eliminate the potential damages caused by compromised nodes at the first time. IDSs usually act as the second layer in MANETs, and they are a great complement to existing proactive approaches. Anantvalee and Wu presented a very thorough survey on contemporary IDSs in MANETs. In this section, we mainly describe three existing approaches, namely, Watchdog , TWOACK , and Adaptive ACKnowledgement (AACK).

**1) Watchdog:** Marti *et al.* proposed a scheme named Watchdog that aims to improve the throughput of network with the presence of malicious nodes. In fact, the Watchdog scheme is consisted of two parts, namely, Watchdog and Pathrater. Watchdog serves as an IDS for MANETs. It is responsible for detecting malicious node misbehaviors in the network. Watchdog detects malicious misbehaviors by promiscuously listening to its next hop's transmission. These advantages have made the Watchdog scheme a popular choice in the field. Many MANET IDSs are either based on or developed as an improvement to the Watchdog scheme. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Marti *et al.* the Watchdog scheme fails to detect malicious misbehaviors with the presence of the following: 1) ambiguous collisions; 2) receiver collisions; 3) limited transmission power; 4) false misbehavior report; 5) collusion; and 6) partial dropping.

**2) Twoack:** With respect to the six weaknesses of the Watchdog scheme, many researchers proposed new approaches to solve these issues. the contrary to many other schemes, TWOACK is neither an enhancement nor a Watchdog-based scheme. Aiming to resolve the receiver collision and limited transmission power problems of Watchdog, TWOACK detects misbehaving links by acknowledging every data packet transmitted over every three consecutive nodes along the path from the source to the destination. Upon retrieval of a packet, each node along the route is required to send back acknowledgment packet to the node that is two hops away from it down the route.

**3) Aack:** Based on TWOACK, Sheltami *et al.* proposed a new scheme called AACK. Similar to TWOACK, AACK is an acknowledgment-based network layer scheme which can be considered as a combination of a scheme called TACK (identical to TWOACK) and an end-to-end acknowledgment scheme called ACKnowledge (ACK). Compared to TWOACK, AACK significantly reduced network overhead while still capable of maintaining or even surpassing the same network throughput. In the ACK scheme is the source node S sends out Packet 1 without any overhead except 2 b of flag indicating the packet type.

## **B. Digital Signature**

Digital signatures have always been an integral part of cryptography in history. Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of information security such as confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication, and data origin authentication . The security in MANETs is defined as a combination of processes, procedures, and systems used to ensure confidentiality, authentication, integrity, availability, and nonrepudiation .Digital signature is a widely adopted approach to ensure the authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation of MANETs. It can be generalized as a data string, which associates a message (in digital form) with some originating entity, or an electronic analog of a written signature. Digital signature schemes can be mainly divided into the following two categories.

**1) Digital signature with appendix:** The original message is required in the signature verification algorithm. Examples include a digital signature algorithm (DSA).

**2) Digital signature with message recovery:** This type of scheme does not require any other information besides the signature itself in the verification process. Examples include RSA.

In this research work, we implemented both DSA and RSA in our proposed EAACK scheme. The main purpose of this implementation is to compare their performances in MANETs.

First, a fixed-length message digest is computed through a preagreed hash function  $H$  for every message  $m$ . This process can be described as

$$H(m) = d. (1)$$

Second, the sender Alice needs to apply its own private key  $Pr-Alice$  on the computed message digest  $d$ . The result is a signature  $SigAlice$ , which is attached to message  $m$  and Alice's secret private key

$$SPr-Alice(d) = SigAlice. (2)$$

To ensure the validity of the digital signature, the sender Alice is obliged to always keep her private key  $Pr-Alice$  as a secret without revealing to anyone else. Otherwise, if the attacker Eve gets this secret private key, she can intercept the message and easily forge malicious messages with Alice's signature and send them to Bob. As these malicious messages are digitally signed by Alice, Bob sees them as legit and authentic messages from Alice. Thus, Eve can readily achieve malicious attacks to Bob or even the entire network. Next, Alice can send a message  $m$  along with the signature  $SigAlice$  to Bob via an unsecured channel. Bob then computes the received message  $m_*$  against the preagreed hash function  $H$  to get the message digest  $d_*$ . This process can be generalized as

$$H(m_*) = d_*. (3)$$

Bob can verify the signature by applying Alice's public key  $Pk-Alice$  on  $SigAlice$ , by using

$$SPk-Alice(SigAlice) = d. (4)$$

If  $d == d_*$ , then it is safe to claim that the message  $m_*$  transmitted through an unsecured channel is indeed sent from Alice and the message itself is intact.

### III. PROBLEM DEFINITION

Our proposed approach EAACK is designed to tackle three of the six weaknesses of Watchdog scheme, namely, false misbehavior, limited transmission power, and receiver collision. In this section, we discuss these three weaknesses in detail. In a typical example of receiver collisions, after node A sends Packet 1 to node B, it tries to overhear if node B forwarded this packet to node C; meanwhile, node X is forwarding Packet 2 to node C. In such case, node A overhears that node B has successfully forwarded Packet 1 to node C but failed to detect that node C did not receive this packet due to a collision between Packet 1 and Packet 2 at

node C. In the case of limited transmission power, in order to preserve its own battery resources, node B intentionally limits its transmission power so that it is strong enough to be overheard by node A but not strong enough to be received by node C.

#### IV. SCHEME DESCRIPTION

In this section, we describe our proposed EAACK scheme in detail. The approach described in this research paper is based on our previous work, where the backbone of EAACK was proposed and evaluated through implementation. In this paper, we extend it with the introduction of digital signature to prevent the attacker from forging acknowledgment packets.

##### A. ACK

As discussed before, ACK is basically an end-to-end acknowledgment scheme. It acts as a part of the hybrid scheme in EAACK, aiming to reduce network overhead when no network misbehavior is detected. In Fig. 8, in ACK mode, node S first sends out an ACK data packet *Pad1* to the destination node D. If all the intermediate nodes along the route between nodes S and D are cooperative and node D successfully receives *Pad1*, node D is required to send back an ACK acknowledgment packet *Pak1* along the same route but in a reverse order.

##### B. S-ACK

The S-ACK scheme is an improved version of the TWOACK scheme proposed by Liu *et al*. The principle is to let every three consecutive nodes work in a group to detect misbehaving nodes. For every three consecutive nodes in the route, the third node is required to send an S-ACK acknowledgment packet to the first node.

##### C. MRA

The MRA scheme is designed to resolve the weakness of Watchdog when it fails to detect misbehaving nodes with the presence of false misbehavior report. The false misbehavior report can be generated by malicious attackers to falsely report innocent nodes as malicious. This attack can be lethal to the entire network when the attackers break down sufficient nodes and thus cause a network division. The core of MRA scheme is to authenticate whether the destination node has received the reported missing packet through a different route.

## D. DIGITAL SIGNATURE

As discussed before, EAACK is an acknowledgment-based IDS. All three parts of EAACK, namely, ACK, S-ACK, and MRA, are acknowledgment-based detection schemes. They all rely on acknowledgment packets to detect misbehaviors in the network. Thus, it is extremely important to ensure that all acknowledgment packets in EAACK are authentic and untainted. Otherwise, if the attackers are smart enough to forge acknowledgment packets, all of the three schemes will be vulnerable. With regard to this urgent concern, we incorporated digital signature in our proposed scheme. In order to ensure the integrity of the IDS, EAACK requires all acknowledgment packets to be digitally signed before they are sent out and verified until they are accepted.

## V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION


In this section, we concentrate on describing our simulation environment and methodology as well as comparing performances through simulation result comparison with Watchdog, TWOACK, and EAACK schemes.

### A. Simulation Methodologies

To better investigate the performance of EAACK under different types of attacks, we propose three scenario settings to simulate different types of misbehaviors or attacks.

### B. Performance Evaluation

To provide readers with a better insight on our simulation results,



**Fig. 1. Simulation results for scenario 1—PDR**

**1) Simulation Results—Scenario 1:** In scenario 1, malicious nodes drop all the packets that pass through it. Fig. 1 shows the simulation results that are based on PDR. In Fig. 1, we observe

that all acknowledgment-based IDSs perform better than the Watchdog scheme. Our proposed scheme EAACK surpassed Watchdog’s performance by 21%




Fig. 2. Simulation results for scenario 1—RO




Fig. 3. Simulation results for scenario 2—PDR

when there are 20% of malicious nodes in the network. From the results, we conclude that acknowledgment-based schemes, including TWOACK, AACK, and EAACK, are able to detect misbehaviors with the presence of receiver collision and limited transmission power. However, when the number of malicious nodes reaches 40%, our proposed scheme EAACK’s performance is lower than those of TWOACK and AACK. We generalize it as a result of the introduction of MRA scheme, when it takes too long to receive an MRA acknowledgment from the destination node that the waiting time exceeds the predefined threshold. The simulation results of RO in scenario 1 are shown in Fig. 2. We observe that DSR and Watchdog scheme achieve the best performance, as they do not require acknowledgment scheme to detect misbehaviors. Although EAACK requires digital signature at all acknowledgment process, it still manages to maintain lower network overhead in most cases. We conclude that this happens as a result of the introduction of our hybrid scheme.

**2) Simulation Results—Scenario 2:** In the second scenario, we set all malicious nodes to send out false misbehavior report to the source node whenever it is possible. This scenario setting is designed to test the IDS’s performance under the false misbehavior report. Fig. 3 shows the achieved simulation results based on PDR. When malicious nodes are 10%, EAACK performs 2% better than AACK and TWOACK. When the malicious nodes are at 20% and 30%, EAACK outperforms all the other schemes and maintains the PDR to over 90%.




Fig. 4. Simulation results for scenario 2—RO




Fig. 5. Simulation results for scenario 3—PDR




Fig. 6. Simulation results for scenario 3—RO

**3) Simulation Results—Scenario 3:** In scenario 3, we provide the malicious nodes the ability to forge acknowledgment packets. This way, malicious nodes simply drop all the packets that they

receive and send back forged positive acknowledgment packets to its previous node whenever necessary. This is a common method for attackers to degrade network performance while still maintaining its reputation. The PDR performance comparison in scenario 3 is shown in Fig. 3. We can observe that our proposed scheme EAACK outperforms TWOACK and AACK in all test scenarios. We believe that this is because EAACK is the only scheme which is capable of detecting forged acknowledgment packets.

**4) DSA and RSA:** In all of the three scenarios, we witness that the DSA scheme always produces slightly less network overhead than RSA does. This is easy to understand because the signature size of DSA is much smaller than the signature size of RSA. However, it is interesting to observe that the RO differences between RSA and DSA schemes vary with different numbers of malicious nodes. The more malicious nodes there are, the more ROs the RSA scheme produces.

## VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Packet-dropping attack has always been a major threat to the security in MANETs. In this research paper, we have proposed a novel IDS named EAACK protocol specially designed for MANETs and compared it against other popular mechanisms in different scenarios through simulations. We think that this tradeoff is worthwhile when network security is the top priority. In order to seek the optimal DSAs in MANETs, we implemented both DSA and RSA schemes in our simulation. Eventually, we arrived to the conclusion that the DSA scheme is more suitable to be implemented in MANETs. To increase the merits of our research work, we plan to investigate the following issues in our future research:

- 1) Possibilities of adopting hybrid cryptography techniques to further reduce the network overhead caused by digital signature;
- 2) Examine the possibilities of adopting a key exchange mechanism to eliminate the requirement of predistributed keys;
- 3) Testing the performance of EAACK in real network environment instead of software simulation.

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